Page 416 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968

Soi'ne 172 Vietnarnese and Arnerican troops were killed in
action, sorne 650 wounded, 4Z assorted weapons Iost, the city's fuel
reserves alrtlost complerely destroyed 700, 000 litres oi fuel burned
and sorr-re 300 tons ol assoried arnrno destroyed. Last but not least,
a fifth of the city's public and private structures were destroyed or
irreparably darnaged whereas another two-{ifths of the civilian property
was either rnoderately or lightly darnaged.
On the other side of the balance sheet the enerny lost
about 800 kilied. These personnel losses included coolie laborers
clraited from arnong the civilians living in ener:rry controlled areas to
carry arnrnunition and supplies. He also Iost 359 assorted weapons,
including 63 crew served ones.

The governrnent side also suffered the loss of sorne 700
prisoners" only a {ew of who}r1 were recaptured later, Many of these
prisoners served the enerny. The nurnber of prisoner-turned guerrillas
rlay have rnade up for s olrr'e o{ the enerny casualties.
According to Maj Vo Kharn, cornrnander of the 14th
Infantry Regirnent during the counter-offensive, the enerny rnight well
have captured the Trinh Tuong Carnp had he thrown his 84Oth and
48Znd Battalions into the battle at the sarne tirne. The enerny had
waited {or two days be{ore corr-rrniting the 84Oth battalion to reinforce
the 482nd. This caused ihe enerny to take rnore casualties. The ene-
rnyrs delay in cornrnirting the 840th Battalion gave the friendly side
enough tirne to send in reinforcernents and to defeat both enerny
batialions in the battle.

Perhaps the enernv had underestirnated the carnprs ability
to resist long enough to be reinforced by <.rther: frienCiy forces. Maybe
the enemy was sirnply unable to con:rrnit the 840th Battalion in tirne.

During the second attack the eneIny tried to correct this
r-nistake. He cornrnitted these two battalions sirrrultaneousiy into one
major objective - the Sector Cornrnand headquarters. But it was too
late {or hirn to succeed. The enem)'rs hugging tactics harnpered
friendiy use ol air ar'd artillerv support yet ihe fighting sti11 caused
extensive ploperty da.rnag e to ihe ciiy. The enerrrT's tactics were
skilful and dar:ing indeed. The eneroy's defeat can be attributed to the
youthfulness of his rnen - t5 to 16 years o1d - and their lack of
gxperience and training in street {ighting.

- 4r8 -