Page 12 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968
P. 12

PREFACE





                             Authors of strategic tenets, past and present,  have dis_
             played one noted sirnilarity  : advocacy of any strategern  to accorn-
             plish the objectives  .  In actual warfare it is only natural that a party to
             a con{lict should  take full  advantage of the opponentrs weaknesse6
             to better its own chance of success.

                             Sun-tse, the great Chinese strategist,  has dwelt exten_
             sively on this point in a book entitled       "Military   Struggler'. A Chinese
             rnilitary  author of the narne of Ly Te Xuyen,  who lived rnany centu-
             ries after Sun, also was to propose sornething  closely related to the
             Chinese rnasterrs  teaching.  In his book entitled        "VIET    DIEN U LINH
             TAPtr, Xuyen clairned that,trlt is rnuch better to attack the enerny than
             to wait f or his attackrr.

                             Against this background of military  advice, should we
            forgive  North Vietnarn  and the Cornrnunist Liberation Front (NLF)for
             seeking our destruction  in the holiday period that rnarked the begin-
            ning of the Year of the Monkey (1968)? This action was in obvious
            conternpt  of the safety  and well-being of the coqlrrron people.
                             No, we certainly should not.

                             The enerny should not get all the blarne, however. Each
            and evety one of us should clairn eorne o{ it too. We cornrnitted  the
            rnistake of considering  our foes as civiLized hurnan beings lrhose sug-
            gestion for  a week-long holiday truce reflected to sorne extent a re6-
            pect for traditions and the well-being of the citizen. In the pre-Tet
            days of 1a6t year we also rnade the tragic error  of under  e stirnating
            the rnac hi.ave lli srn of our foes and failed to devise proper rneaaures to
            prevent their plot.

                             For those who still  nurtured doubts about the ;rx'ickednegs
            of the enerny or still  rnight toy with the idea that the Cornrnuniste
            lare   patriots in thei.r own wayrr,the  Tet offensive  was the beet oppor-
            tunity to see the Viet Cong insurgents  and their North Vietnarnese
            accornplices in their true light. Not only did the Cornrnunists  ahow
            absolute conternpt  for the peoplers  welfare in starting an unpreceden-
            ted offensive at the height of the nationrs rro6t        gacred   holiday but
            their conduct throughout  the land eloquently  disproved their clairne


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