Page 483 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968
P. 483

CONCLUSION




       THE  Tet  Offensive  was the largest carnpaign  ever staged by the
       Viet Cong, It took thern over a year to        Prepare    lt  and all of their
       resources and resourcefulness  to execute  the plan of battle that they
       hoped would shift the rnilitary balance in their favor.
                         Now that the carnpaign  has corne to an end with both
       success and failure characterising its developrnent. The carnpaign
       rnarks a definite turning point in the Vietnarn  cri.sis which ernphasizes
       the f ollowing point s :
                         In the first  place, the   rrTetrr   offensive brought the
       fighting war  to a new degree of intensity in which new strategic and
       tactical concepts were initiated,  The new Viet Cong strategy was
       rnainly  based on our subjectiwe assessrnent of the enernyrs capabilities
       and their troop deployrnents in-country  and diplornatic  rnoves abroad.
       A11 rnoves were airned at striking a decisive blow, Tactically, the
       Viet  Cong relied  on surprise  attacks -  in the daytirne, during a
       holiday period and in the course of a holiday ceasefire.

                         In the second place, the general offensive  carnpaign
       soon becarne  a general retreat.  In bringing the war into the cities'
       the enerny also cornrnitted  two rnistakes : the deployrnent of an arrny
       of guerrillas in cities,  and their inacurate assessrnent of  popular
       support.  These two rristakes resulted  in the total failure of their
       offensive campaign.

                         In the third place, it  sornehow brought about the joint
       partici.pation of  US and Viet Cong delegations  in the Paris conference.
       The opening  of the Paris talks could be explained by Hanoirs weariness
       and Washingtonrs desire to placate anti-war sentirnenta both in the
       US and abroad. This is definitely  a turning point in the struggle which
       then becarne rnore political than military  although  the fir'st  stage of
       the talks brought about nothing drarnatic.
                '
                         On the side of  the Republic  of Vietnarn arrned forces,
       the  rrTettr  developrnents indicated the following shortcornings : (1) Over-
       conJidence in  oners strength, thus a prevailing rnood of complacency
       in every walk of life.  Too rnuch seLf -interest which was incompatible
       with the conditions ln a country  at war.  These shortcornings  can be

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