Page 484 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968
P. 484

partly traced to  an attitude of ower-reliance  on the Arnerican  a1lies
     in spite of the rnany cal1s of the nationrs leaders to rnore austerity
     and dedication  to national unity. The feeling of over reli.ance was
      still  very rnuch intact until the day the enerny struck.

                       On the   Part  of our Arnerican allies,  there also was too
     rnuch optirni srn.
                        The VC,too, suJfered frorn this optirnism,  As they
     failed to gain their objectives, they soon recognized  that the rnain
      reason for their failure was that they skipped a stage of the doctrine
      of revolutionary warfare. This truth was apparent in rnany captured
      C ornrnuni st docurnents.  Moreover, the Viet Cong failure also resulted
      in incornparable losses in rnanpower and equipment, followed by
      deteriorating  rnorale that had its best reflections  in their lack of
      confidence in the traditional Cornrnunist strategy and the leadership
      of the Party.
                        Following step by steP the long       rrTetrr  campaign,  one
      certainly would see rnore than an indication  of Ilanoirs war weariness'
      This had its best reflections  in; an ever growing nurnber of teenaged
      cornbatants  sent to the frontline without adequate  Preparation,           in the
      dipping rnorale of Viet Cong troops, who becarne rnore and rnore
      unwilling to rnake the necessary sacri{ices,  and the rnounting di-fficul-
      ties faced by the C ornrnuni st war machinery  in bringing so many
      people and supplies to the Southern frontlines.
                        The enerny was faced with very rnuch the sarne dilemma
      before and after their     rrTetrt  offensive. Since they were unable to win
      the war mititarily  in the face of strong a1lied power, their exPectations
      to achieve a rnilitary victory turned into gloorn. There lies the reason
      why the conflict  was brought to the c:nference table that originally
      saw only the participation  of US and North Vietnamese  delegates'

                        In this last phase of the conflict, the enern)t again tried
      in vain to bring the war to the cities of South Vietnarn. His failule  to
      achieve  any clearcut victories,  however, once rnore resulted  in the
      death of thousands  of innocent civilians and the destruction  of rnany
      populous areas. It also reflected the enernyrs  resentment at not being
      supported by the people since there is no other explanation for the
      pounding of populated areas with lZZrnrn rockets.
                        In the view of qtite a few Vietnarrrese observers,  this
      also indicates the enernyrs inability to enter serious negociations



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