Page 19 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968
P. 19

which rnight grow even bigger in view of the reported presence  of
               another two PAVN divisions in that general area, the U.S. and Viet-
               narnese High Cornrnands reduced  by twelve hours an original  48-hour
               Tet truce. Still,  there would be no rnilitary activities on the part of the
               Allies frorn six PM January 29 to six AM January 31.
                               The Vj.etnarne se Joint General Staff (JGS) and MACV,
               however, took the precaution of ordering a series of rneasures for  an
               effective defense of the two noxthernrnost  provinces of Quang Tri  and
               Thua Thien, These included  arnong other thing s the expansion of local
               garrisons to 50,000 rnen. Also an airborne task force was dispatched
               to Hue and elernents  of the U. S. lst  Airrnobile  Division were ordered
               North.

                               Prior  to Tet only the Second and Ninth Airborne Batta-
               lions had arrived in the northern provinces. Only on the second day
               of the Year of the Monkey (Jan,3f), did the staJf of the task force and
               the Seventh Battalion arrive in the forrner irnperial capital.  Mean-
               while the U. S. Airrnobile Division had arrived frorn An Khe but it took
               up a position frorn which it could not easily reach Hue. Both Vietna-
               rnese and U.S. reinforcernents  had been intended sirnply for relieving
               Khe Sanh in the event of rnajor raids and thus did not get involved in
               local rnilitary  operations.
                               At that tirne it was the general consensus  ol rnilitary
               strategists and tacticians that the Viet Cong were only capable of con-
               ducti.ng  large scale operations  for a short tirne frorn bases of opera-
               tion located along the borders. Any attacks of this nature were doorned
               to failure.  Wi.th forces disposed in this way it was certain that the ene-
               rny could gain nothing of irnportance as the situation in progress so
               indicated.
                               As to the in-country  operation, it was estirnated  in staff
               planning  that the enerny force stationed within the country were able
               to rnount rnultibattalion-si  ze attacks airned at creating  rePercussions
               within the population.  They were only capable of launching attacks for
               short periods  of tirne. Large scale or long terrn attacks  doorned  thern
               to de struction.
                               The balance of forces as well  as the general  situation
               in South Vietnarn, after the seesaw battles at Con Tien and Dakto and
               the friendly victories  at Loc Ninh and Phuoc  Qua,  seerned to indicate
               a favorable  trend that would ultirnately  result in the victorious conclu-
               sion of the war for the friendly side.


                                                                                                    -23 -
   14   15   16   17   18   19   20   21   22   23   24