Page 455 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968
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forces.  The AK50 was introduced into South Vietnarn  by the end of
      1962 when it was captured  by governrnent forces in Phuoc Chau,
      Quang Tin. Its sharp bayonet can cut barbed wire and dig srnall holes'
      The rnore rnodern AK 47 was rnanufactured to replace the AK 50 as well
      as the serni- autornatic  SKS carbin. The AK 47 weighs 4.800 kilograrns
      including  its arnrnunition,  and has a range of 400 rneters while the
      AK 50 weighs  5.450 kilograrns with a range of only 200 rneters. Each
       soldier can carry up to 400 rounds with each rnagazine containing  30
      to 35 rounds. Both tyPes of AK were used by the Viet Cong in the
      general offensive.  The AK firepower  is considered  equal to the
      Arnerican  M.16.
                         Like the Soviet forces in World War II,  each Viet Cong
      assault platoon involved in the general offensive  was equipped with
       one or two B.40 or B.41 while platoon rnernbers were individually
      arrned with AK guns for either sporadic or uninterrupted firing'

                         The rnoderni zatiol:' of VC weaponry  should have been
      begun years ago since before it  could be carried out it required long
       p.iioa"  of tirne for  solliciting rnodern arrns supplies frorn cornrnunist
       countries, transporting thern into South Vietnarn  through North Viet-
       narn, and for training personnel  in handling thern.
                         In addition to infantry weapons,  heavy artillery  guns'
       particularly  the IZZ rnm rocket, were also used by the enerny in
       their o{fensive against the cities.
                         Sorne  C ornrnunist Chinese 107 rnrn rockets were also
       fired into the capital city in May 1968. This rocket weighs  26 kilo-
       grarns  and. is less efficient  than the l?Z rnrn, The 107 rnrn rocket had
       been supplied to North Vietnarn  by Cornrnunist China since Septernber
       1962, but it dirl not appear on the battlefield  in the South until 9 rnonths

       late r .
                         The rnodernization  o{ enerny weaPonry from a prirnitive
       level into one superior to our own fire  power in view of a decisive
       battle was one of the rnany surprises of the Vietnarn war  (1)

                         Why the delay in rnodernizing the ARVN {orces ?
                         High-ranking US rnilitary  authorities in Vietnam
       blarned the White House and the civilian authorities at the Pentagon
       for the slow    Process.   They put forward the following argurnents  :

                         -  Frorn 1961, Washington  had believed  that the RVN
       forces were not willing to fight and supplies  of new weapons would


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