Page 456 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968
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in the end go to the enerny and constitute a waste of rnoney;
                         -  Washington  had planned no aurplus of arrns when the
       war is over only upon seeing the deterrnination for cornbat of the
       RVN forces in the course of the C ornrnunist Tet offensive did Washing-
       ton realize that RVN troops were real soldiers.
                         It was not until 1l April  1968 that US Defense  Secretary
       Clark Cli{ford  announce  the beginning of the rnodernization of RVN
       troops to rnatch the enernyrs rnodern equiprnent  which included light
       weapons, rockets, heawy rnachineguns  and rnortars (2)


                      E. -  TRAINING IN CITY STREET FIGHTING
                         Cornrnunist  docurnents  captured  during and aJter the
       Tet offensive indicated that enerny troops had been trained for both
       the rnethod and technique of city street fighting. The enerny training
       docurnents had been prepared long before the general offensive, while
       others were prepared during the offensive in view of subsequent
       wave s of attack  s .
                         The docurnents  placed heavy ernphasis on rnilitary
       theory, but only a few dealt with actual experiences gathered in the
       coui:se of the offensive itself.  Tactics cited in the docurnents  concerned
       infantry units only. There was no rnention of other branches such as
       artillery  and r ocket"

                         The docurnents,  however,  were r.rore suitable for
       guerilla warfare  than for conventional warfare. They deserve attention
       as the experiences  gathered rnay lead the Viet Cong to preparing  a
       rnajor rnilitary  handbook  that suits the peculiarities of the Vietnarn
       war.


                         In bringing the war into the cities,  the Cornrnunists
       entered  what they called the      rrtotal   warrr phase, characterized  by a



        (1) During the Cornrnunist Tet Mar Than general offensive, only rnore
       than a half of our l0 in{antry divisions and rnarine, airborne and
       ranger units -  the rnain units of our arrned forces - were equipped
       with the M-16 which they received only a few days before Tet, This
       was a surprise  to the Viet Cong who had expected  a less strong fire
       power on our part.  But our units rnet with sorne difficulties as they
       had not been very familiar  with the new weapon.

       (z) Cf.  US. News and World Report,  8 July 1968,

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