Page 461 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968

What the Communists learned

from their general offensive

Frorn their offensive against Saigon, the Viet Cong
learned sorne experLences in city fighting which they clairned were
particuLarly useful. Herc are sorne of their seerningly rnost sound
conclusions :
- Before the offensive, sapper and ranger units as
well as city underground elernents should be launched deeP into the
target area. The rnain attacking force will follow. This was the plan
the enerny f ollowed during the second offensive wave in May 1968.
The Cornrnunist rnain force was then able to Penetrate the 5th, 6th
and ?th precincts because it had been preceded in the areas by the
sapper, ranger and underground elernents. During the first offensiwe
wave the sapper elernents were inserted with the rnain {orce and were
not able to create favorable conditions fcr the enerny to take control
of street blocks.

- In defense of their positions, the Viet Cong would
leave only a srnall force to face our troops while their rnain force
would split into several units which would concentrate when ordered
on flank or rear attacks. The enerny called this a cornbination of defen-
sive and surprise offensive tactics. The size of the surprise offensive
force would be frorn platoon to cornpany strength. Diversionary
tactics and various disguised rnethods would also be used extensively,
particularly in intelligence and reconnaissance operations.
- The rnovernents of cornbat units into and within the
city require easy-to-carry equiprnent and reduced nurnbers. Each
squad would have no rnore than 7 rnen divided into 3 cells : 2 cornbat
cells and I anti-tank cell, A Platoon would consist of only two squads.
But a cornpany should have 5 or 6 platoons as the c ornpany is the
basic cornbat unit in city fighting and requires cornbat supPort as
well as antiaircraft and engineering suPPorts. The troop rnovernent
within the city should be avoided. Destruction of street larnps should
be carried out when necessary. Guides rnust be efficient and as
nurrre r ou s as po s sible,
As far as weapons are concerned, extensive use of
the 8.40 and 8.41 should be avoided because of their lirnited effect.

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