Page 464 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968

Causes of Viet Cong Tet defeat

The Cornrnunist Tet offensive was the result of long
rnonths of planning. In their own judgernent, as rnaintained in a Corn-
rnunist docurnent cornplernenting what was known as their rrDecision
No 13tt, the tirne had corne for decisive action on all three fronts
- poLitical, rnilitary and rnilitary prosellting - to achieve final victory.
The C ornrnunists chose to launch their general offen-
sive on a day when it.was less expected by the governrnent side : the
day of the Tet cease-fire' a truce which the Viet Cong thernselves
had proposed to expand to three days.
They had changed their strategy of encirc).ing the
cities frorn strong positions in the rural areas into one airned at
taking over the cities in order to liberate the countryside. In case
of success of their rrgeneral offensive general uprisingrr plan, they
would forrn a coalition governrnent in Saigon and dernand that the
United States leave South Vietnarn. In case of failure, their forces
would go back to the countryside, leaving behind special guerilla and
sapper elernents to create a perrnanent state of disorder in the cities.
Tactically speaking, the C ornrnunist plan consisted of
three phases:

1. Infiltration of guerilla units as well as arrns and
arnrnunition into the cities and townships for cornbined action with
underground sapper elernents in opening the offensive'

2. Regular enemy forces would subsequently enter the
scene and occupy key rnilitary and adrninistrative installations, par-
ticularly radio stations to broadcast both taped C ornrnunist staternents
and forced appeals to the population by locaL rnilitary and adrninis-
trative offic ials.
3. Street dernonstrations in support of the Viet Cong,
calling for a cease fire and the forrnation of a coalition governrnent.
In spite of the enernyrs deterrnination to win in
launching their offensive and i.ts being so well planned, the results

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