Page 467 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968
P. 467

speaking there was no syrnpathy  with the enerny. The general reaction

       of the population  throughout the country was recorded  as follows :
                         -  Everybody sought to flee the battle scene although
       the enerny tried hard to prevent people frorn fleeing;

                         -  Except  Hue where a srnall rninority  supported the
       enemy, people in a1l other cities rernained  indifferent to the C ornrnu-
       nist c all for rebellion;

                         -  In only a few provinces,  peaaants were brought into
       town by the enerny for  street dernonstrations,  but they were stopped
       and disbanded  as soon as they reached the cityts outskirts, and
       showed signs of relief upon escaping enerny hands;
                         -  There were no popular rnovernents,  Only leaflets
       were distributed by sorne Cornrnunist political  cadres operating
       underground,

                         As early as on the very first  day of the general offen-
       sive, one could already see the strategic errors of tlre whole Corn-
       rnunist p1an. The enerny had indeed underestirnated  the ARVN strength
       A high-ranking VC cadre by the narne of Narn Dong, arrested befbre
       the offensiwe,  said the Cornrnunists believed  the ARVN had no capa-
       cities {or both offensi.ve  and defensive  actions  because ARVN sol-diers
       had no ideal to fight for,  being rnere rnercenaries  for the irnperialists.
       The Cornrnunists  had expected that a general, surprise  o{fensive  into
       key ARVN positions would cause the collapse of the whole RVN arrny.

                         Such a reasoning,  based on subjective considerations
       rather than facts,  was the cause of the C ornrnuni st defeat.
                         The RVN arrned forces, indeed, have always been
       anirnated by a strong anti - C ornrnuni st tradition rnarked by a deep

       (l) Throughout  the offensive period, the VC radio broadcast false
       reports of defections to their side by a nurnber of officers and enlisted
       rnen of tlne Z/9 Battalion and the 269th Regional Force  C ornpany.  In
       reality,  these units were fighting fiercely and inflicted heavy casual-
       tie s on the enerny.
       (Z) ffre reaction was irnrnediate  in aknost all the cities and townships
       throughout  the country, within no rnore than 3 hours after the enerny
       offensive was launched. Hue was a particular  case with the reaction
      force being isolated.
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