Page 471 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968
P. 471

-  The date and tirne of the of{ensive had been delayed
       without all units being inforrned,  resulting in discrepancies that
       reduced the initial  surprise factor.

                          -  Ttre general offensive and general uprising plan was
       carried out at a tirne when the ARVN and allied {orces were in a
        trshakytr   position (?) and not entirely depressed a6 they still  had
       1, 200, 000 rnen availablb  (sic).

                          The sarne docurnent  presented  a po6t-offensive VC
       reasoning as {ollows  :
                          rr  The General  Offensive  was an operation, a continued
       fighting  phaBe that will  last until the final victory.  How long it would
       Iast depends on our efforts and leadership           rt.

                          The operation as envisaged by the VC irnplied three
       po e sible  developrnents:
                          1. General offensive and general uprising at the sarne
       tirne.
                          2, General offensive first,  followed at a certain point
       by general upri sing.

                          3. General  Offensive  without  auccess in inciting the
       population  into general uprising : in this case, the troops rnust
       withdraw and regain strength to 6tart all over again,

                          The Viet Cong said the first  developrnent  did not occur,
       the second developrnent  was obtained in Hue, and the third developrnent
       was what happened  in all the other cities and townships.

                          The C ornrnunists were defeated  in both thei.r strategic
        and tactical schernes,  but they were clever enough to conceal their
        defeat under sorne new terrninology,  a field in which they had been
        specialized, Unsuccessful  as it was in achieving what it had been
        intended for,  the   trGeneral   Offensive - General Uprisingrt now had
        its decisiveness substituted  by the notion of protracted, flexible
        pursuit of the sarne goal. This was to boost the rnorale of Cornrnunist
        soldiers which had been on the verge of collapse  following  the bloody
        Tet frontal assaults. Cornrnunists leaders knew only too well that
        their troop u.nits were good only for guerilla and countryside warfare,
        and their participation  in frontal attacks against the cities would
        cause resentrnent and perplexity  arnong the regional.  cadres.



        -476-
   466   467   468   469   470   471   472   473   474   475   476