Page 474 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968
P. 474

in the case of Quang Ngai), Political cadre6 in seeking  to fornent  an
      uprising were relying on the troops while the troops were relying on
       a political success.
                         Thus, the general offensive strategy of the enerny had
      been conceived beyond the tactical capabilities of the Cornrnunist
       units in South Vietnarn  who were but guerilla units unable to cope with
       conventional  warfare facing an opponent arrny with strong supporting
      {irepower.

                         AII that the general offensive  was able to achieve was
       a propaganda  irnpact and confusion,  death and destruction  arnong the
       urban population, for which the C ornrnunists had to pay a high price
       in hurnan lives and weapons,

                                         C. - POLITICAL

                         The Viet Cong created a new political organization
       called the   rrAlliance  of National,  Dernocratic and Peace{ul Forcesrt,
       also called Front Nurnber Two, Why ? According to Huynh Tuong'
       a Khanh Hoa provincial  political corrrrnissioner  who was arrested in
       Nhatrang during the Tet offensive, stated that even high-ranking VC
       cadre in the South did not understand this new rnove. They contended
       that the  rrNational   Liberation Frontrr had been conducting the war
       against the Arnerican  irnperialists and the Saigon regirne in the narne
       of the people of South Vietnarn since the end of 1960, and there was
       no reason for  substituting it  with another front.  What was harder
       for  thern to understand  about the forrnation of the Alliance was the
       {act that the NLF had been expanded since late 1967 to include rnore
       elernents  as indicated  by a  change in its  name (1).

                         The issue was quite embrassing  for high-ranking Com-
       munist cadre who had to try to explain  the new rnove. As the narne
       rrLiberation   Frontrr,  had been farniliar to the people and had brought
       sorne significance to the struggle in South Vietnarn  despite it being
       actually supported by the North Vietnarnese Corornunists in a war of
       aggression  against the S:uth. There{ore,  why change the narne.

                         But Nortlr vietnarn  had a diJferent  view  point. Con-
       vinced tbat the 1968 general  offensive  would lead to a final victory



       (1) Frorn  trLiberation   Front of South Vietnamt' to       I'National  Liberation
           Front of South Vietnarnrr.



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