Page 472 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968
P. 472

They gave to the Tet general offensive a new direction
       to prove that the partyrs leadership could not have been rnistaken.  As
       a rnatter of fact, when the general offensive strategy was put out by
       the partyts leadership,  regional Cornrounist cadres were rnuch
       perplexed a6 to how to irnplernent  it to reach the huge goals set,
       Narnely, the heart of the cities.  Therefore  there was rnuch doubt
       about the success of the plan at its very onset.

                         Docurnents showed that the Cornrnunists had to postpone
       twice the launching of the offensivers  first  phase. The second  phase
       was originally set for Feb. 15, 1968, but was later postponed to 17
       June 1968 and then cancelled  altogether, with only indiscrirninate
       rnortar  and rocket shelLings being launched instead. The third phase,
       originally  planned |or 22 April,  was first  delayed until 28 April  and
       later until 5 May 1968.

                         Internal di{f iculti.e s also forced the enerny to change
       their forces, targets and troop itineraries.  For exarnple, in the
       Tri-Thien-Hue area, the Group 8 force replaced  the Group  9 force
       at the 1a6t rninute.  The Znd sub-zone (North of Long An) had its targetB
       substituted  by those of the 3rd sub-zone (Alnn tan) and vi.ce-versa,
       one day before the offensive. The 9th sub-zone which had originally
       been scheduled to attack Saigonr6 9th Precinct was sent against the
       Highway Bridge instead.
                         Major shortcornings  also were noted in the enernyrs
       cornrnunication  and liaison network. No sooner than the offensive
       was launched  did the C ornrnunist cornrnand lose its contacts with the
       Saigon front.  Units attacking  Saigon also were not able to cornrnunicate
       with one another. Cornrnunist soldiers fled in cornplete disorder, and
       rnany units got lost,  Two cornpanies of the C ornrnuni st 6th Battalion
       happened  to enter the Phu Tho race track area while their target was
       sornewhere  else. The J.0th Ranger s lost contact with the  Rrt f ront
                                                                            tr
       c ornrnand and the sub-zone one cornrnand. Political  cadres based at
       Phu Tho Hoa were unable to comrnunicate with the unit attacking the
       Saigon Radio Station,
                         Also according  to enerny docurnents,  the Cornmuniets
       adrnitted  that although they were able to take control of Hue at the
       beginning,  their offensive  plan was upset due to :
                         - weak defense positions after occupation of the city;
                         -  loss of direction in street fighting;
                         - loose cornbined actions,  slow deployrnents;


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