Page 473 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968

- untirnely use of reserve forces;
- reluctance in concentrating forces for fear of air raids.

Sirnilar circurnstances were noted at other pLaces
throughout the country :

- the enernyrs rnain forces, with the support of sapper
and underground elernents, altet succeeding in entering the citLes,
failed in a1l their attacks against our positions although in sorne cases
the defenders were out nurnbered;
- the enernyrs rnain forces did not have enough troops
after they entered the cities for deci.sive, quick acti.on against our
key po s ition s;
- the attacking forces did not have any rest and lost
all the j.r energy after nightrs f i.ghting; they were able to hold f or a
few rnore days only after taking refuge in civilian houses;
- no enerny reinforcernent was able to reach the city
frcrn out side;
- heavy casualties and losses of weapons were sua_
tained by the enemy everywhere.
Heavy enerny casualties and losses were acclairned by
both local populations and friendly troops throughout the country.
People realized that the Cornrnunist rnoraLe and c ornbat technique were
rnuch lower than they used to be before 1954.
C ornrnunist soldiers, irnpressed by large streets and
tall buildings they had nevet seen before, lost their confidence as
soon as they heard our counter-offensive gunfire,

Other tactical rnistakes on the Cornrnunist part were
noted in cities such as Quang Ngal where the enerny artillery shelLed
the city before the infantry waves were launched, and Nhatrang where
the C ornrnunists concentrated their attacks on rninor positions leaving
the Special Force C ornrnand free to stage a counter-offensive. A
sirnilar circurnstance occured in Konturn where the enerny did. not
attack the Z4th Special Zone C ornrnand on the first day o{ the offensive.
In Phan Thiet, the enemyrs rnain thru6t was against a suburb post.
Generally speaking, Cornmunist soldiers .\x'ere not
battle trained and lacked enthusiasrn. Most of thern, furtherrnore,
were too young, with rnany being new recruits. They were sent into
the cities, where they fought in disorder, not knowing whether they
were winning or losing, or what had been captured or recaptured (as

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