Page 465 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968
P. 465

were not what they had expected, Well r'onceived as it was, their
       whole scherne colJ.apsed in the end, showing how futile Hanoirs e{forts
       had been in rnobilizing all its resources  in pursuit of an illusory
       victory,  The Cornmunists,  however,  will  not give up drearning of
       winning the war through rnilitary  efforts beyond the capacities of a
        srnall nation and with a party dictatorship rnachinery that forces
       innocent people into a destructive, never-ending war.

                          Much has been written here and throughout the wo;:ld,
        on the C ornrnuni st Tet offensive of 1958 with conflictj.ng assessrnents
        of its results. The enerny clairned it was a victory while our side des-
       cribed it  as a rnajor defeat, It is therefore extremely  difficult for us
       to put forth argurnents  of our own in assessing the Tet Mau Than
        events without the risk  of being 1abel1ed as not objective.

                         At the tirne of this writing,  the prelirninary peace
       talks between the United States and the Cornrnunists had already
       begun in Paris in an atternpt to bring the war to an end. A new assess-
       rnent of the causes of the Comrnunist  defeat in their 1958 general
       offensive, therefore,  does not seern out of context :

                                         A. - STRATEGY

                          In their own judgernent, the Cornrnunists rnaintained
       that on the one hand the ARVN had no strength for both offensive and
       defensive actions and would collapse in the face of a total,  surprise
       attack; and on the other hand, the people of South Vietnarn  would
       welcorne  the Viet Cong forces and would help thern destroy the anti-
       revolutionary Saigon re g i rne.

                         What actually occured was the re\,{erse of the C ornrnu-
       nist prediction.  The arrned forces of the RVN did fight well and
       efficiently in both of{ensive  and defensive  acti.ons to repel the C ornrnu-
       nist surprise attack. No ARVN unit surrendered to the enerny although
        sorrle were under heavy  C ornrnuni st pressure. Only a {ew withdrawals
       frorn isolated posts were reported (l),

                         No city or provincial  town was captured  by the enerny,
       and no key rnilitary position feII into enerny hands, while ewen rninor
       positions rernained well defended,

                         Our reaction was irnrnediate (Z) and efficient although
       at the beginning the Arnericans  were rather slow in joining the {ight,
                         As far  as the people were concerned, generally



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