Page 321 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968
P. 321

The 1ocal US garrison  also dispatched a group of tanks
       to support the advancing  troops but the firsi  arrnored vehicl,e to
       arrive at the rnarket place was hit by a 8.40 grenade  that broke              Parts
       o{ its tread. It took the governrnent soldier:s all rnorning  before they
       were able to dislodge  the enerny frorn the downtown section.

                         The situation at the Tan Canh pagoda was a little  rnore
       difficult as enerny troops,taking  advantage of the higher ground there,
       repulsed all atternpts by governrnent  soldiers to take the position' It
       took Major Thoai the whole day to dislodge  the enerny frorn the pagoda.
       The pagoda finally  carne under governrnent control in the evening.

                         In this battle the enerny had deployed  a battalion  of
       troops but only about two cornpanies  had  arrived in  tirne for this
       encounter that cost the cornmunists  over 100 dead. Friendly losses
       were 14 killed and over  30 wounded.


                                      D. -  REMARKS
                         Following the victory,  Major Bui Duc Tai, the chief
       of staff of the Z4th Special  Zone rnade the f ollowing cornment on the
       battle of Tan Canh.
                          rr  If the enerny had had two regirnents of troops and had
       deployed  thern against the adrninistrative  section and the headquarters
       of the Specia). Zone, the outcorne  of the battle could have been dif-
       ferent.

                        rr  But the cornrnunist  cornrnander  was too subjective in
       his assessrnent o{ the situation. His troops, fighting in that night o{
       joy,  were only given the task of attacking  the adrninistrative  section,
       *'hile the Special Zorret s headquarters  where one battalion  of infantry-
       rnen and a group of tanks were garrisoning was not touched.
                        !r  Not having to defend thernselves  these units irnrnediately
       fanned out for a counterattack. Therefore when the enerny decided 24
       hours later to throw in rnore troops the defense of the headquarters
       had been organized. Thus his future attacks repeatedly failed.

                       rr  In the following days aI1 rnilitary activities  of the
        cornrnunists  in this area were the sirnple deeds of a blind rnan unable
       to see around.ll
                          The enerny  succeeded easily in infiltrating the city
       but failed in taking over even poorly guarded rnilitary installations.
        What had been behind this failure  ? Perhaps,  the enerny {orce-had
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