Page 322 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968

spread itself too thin to take over all the scheduled objectives at the
s arne tirne.

Another tactical rnistake cornrnitted by enerny cornrnand-
era was that the enerny failed to bank on the factor of surpr:ise and
concentrate larger rnanpower to take over the key installations during
the first few hours of his offensive. Instead, he cornrnitted only srnall
units to the attack, arnong others, the Special Zone Cornrnand and
MACV cornpounds, located in the rniddle of a vast plot of flat' barren
land. During these attacks he took heavy casualties frorn airstrikes
and artillery fragrnentary shells exploding in rnid-air.
As far as the friendly forces were concerned, they were
only garrison troops with short-terrrr defense caPabilities and aknost
devoid of counter-offensive potentials. They were sorely owerworked
since they were thrown into the counter-offensive right on the following
rnorning of Tet Day and throughout the day, and then ca1led back for
garrison defense duties at night. These troops had been placed under
alrnost constant alert, for rnonths on end prior to the enernyrs offen-
sive. They were understandably incapable of {ighting the enerny on
both the defensive and offensive right at the doorstep of their carnps
and barracks. Had the weather been bad enough to harnper ai'rborne
supplies and reinforcernents, these garrisons lnay have been isolated,
starved and wiped out by the outnurnbering, deterrnined enerny assault
force. The defense of Konturn rnostly depended upon the powerful IJS
forces stationed the re.
( The first division stationed in Konturn was the 12th
division which was later renarned the 22nd Infantry Division' This
division is cornposed of three regirnents the 40th, 41st and 42nd which
were positioned respectively in Konturn, Dakto, and Daksut. From
these positions they dispatched battalion units to operate in border
areas. When enemy Pressure increased governrnent control area
becarne srnaller. However, lhe ZZnd Infantry Division had to rnove to
the coastal area and rnake their headquarters in Qui Nhon city, Binh
Dinh province, In 1965 enerny pressure on Binh Dinh province was
heavy especially aJter the battle at An Lao where the garrison alrnost
collapsed. The 40th Regirnent was sent frorn Konturn to rein{orce this
garrison and later the 41st Regirnent and the light cornrnand post of
tbe ZZnd Infantry Division rnoved io this area to rneet the battle needs.
The 40th and 41st Regirnents were retained here causing the rnain CP
of the division to rnove to Qui Nhon city. The Z4th Special Zone was
forrned at this tirne to coPe with the threat in Konturn. Perhaps {or

- 325 -