Page 37 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968
P. 37

Enernv casualtie s duri.ng the early weeks of the Tet offensive  were par-
           ticularly  heavy but the Cornrounist High Cornrnand sornehow  rnanaged
           to pour into South Vietnarn as rnany replace:..  ".nts  aa needed thus keep-
           ing their fighting strength at approxirnately the sarne level on practi-
           ca1ly all fr ont s.

                            Prior  to the offensive  C ornrnunist  €trength was estirnated
           around 323,000 troops of all types. According to a table o{ estirnated
           Viet Cong strength early in March, the Cornrnunists  Lost about 45,000
           rnen as follows :
           18,600 cornbat troops, 4,000 support troops, 12,400 guerrillas,  5,000
           political cadres, 5000 civilians  and laborers. Cornrnunist  strength
           a.fter ?9 February was estirnated  to be circa 283,500  broken out as fol-
           lows : 110, 600 cornbat troops, 33, 7C0                 troops,  60,ZO0 guerrilla,
                                                         "u-pp*t
           and  7 9,0 00 political  c adre s.

                           These troops were organized  into 97 battalions  and l8
           cornpanies. They were disposed in warious corps areas roughly as
           f ollows : 35 battalions  and l8 cornpanies in I Corps, 28 battali.ons in
           II Corps, 15 battalions  in III Corps, especially  in the area of Saigon-
           Cholon, and 19 battalions  in IV Corps.

                           Prior  to their Tet offensive the Cornrnunists had ptrans
           for  all eventualities.  Should their attack fail,they  would withdraw  their
           troops to countryside  areas bordering on the clties and continue with
           a loose   rrencirclernent   of the townships  by the c ountry sidert, thus giving
           thern the chance to xecover. In addition they would also launch a few
           thrusts  just to keep the Allies preoccupied with territorial  defense
           everywhere while preventing thern frorn rnounting genuine  o{fensive
           arctiorr s.

                           C ornrnencing in March this strategy was to take the f orrn
           of constant rnortar and rocket attacks on the cities which were corn-
           bined with a few incidental  ground assaults of no particular  irnportance.




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