Page 41 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968

hidden under a cover that could be that of any booklet containing the
teachings of Buddha, Cn that particular docurnent was printed the
title rrTe Do Chung Sinhrr or I'To Help Mankindr' ,published by Venerable
Minh Tarn. Even the narne of the publishing hou6e, the Luc Hoa Tang
Publishing C ornpany was included.

Inside the bookLet, however, it was labeled ra study doc_
urnent for a better understanding of the new situation and the new
tasksrr and it was rneant to be studied by low-ranking cadres and V. C.
syrnpathizers. A close exarnination of this brochure shows four parts:

1. Obiective : The V.C. seek the end of the Arnerican
presence in South Vietnarn through the forrnation of a coalition govern-
rnent with the National Liberation Front playing the leading role in
the ar rangernent.

2. Three-Pronged Task : V.C. troops and cadres have
the tasks of seeking the destruction of the U. S, political and rnilitary
position, the collapse of the Vietnarnese arrned forces, and the pro-
motion of a popular uprising,
3. Assessrnent : In assessing the situation in South Viet-
narn the V. C. rnaintain that the rtsearch and de stroy tactic s of the
rr
Allies have failed and that they thernselves have achieved Igreat vic-
toriesrr. They also point to the opening of the Tri-Thien (northern)
front as an indicator of their success in preventing lVestrnoreland
f rorn directing rrlore U. S, soldiers to the Mekong Delta and forcing
hirn to ask for rnore troops.
4. V,C. Shortcornings : A nurnber of shortcornings on the
part of the Viet Cong also are enurnerated such as the lack of coordi-
nation in big operations, their inability to expand guerri).la strength,
the poor perforrnance of sorne V.C. units, the insufficiency of politi-
cal agitation, and the lack of popular support.

The docurnent also specifies that jf the U,S. should not
agree to withdraw its troops frorn Vietnarn and if it should not
grant the Viet Cong the right to play a key role in a coalition govern-
rnent, the Cornrnunists would continue the fight, The struggle would
take the forrn of intense large-sca1e attacks instead of the erstwhile
tactics of protracted struggle so as to be conducive to victory within
the shorte st tirne possible.

The plan of attack, however, was not contained in this
paper. It was to be contained in a plan code-narned TCK_TKN _ the

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