Page 45 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968

In assessing the situation the Hanoi leadership also came
to three sets of conclusions which prompted thern to ernbark on the
new strategic road. In the days irnrnediately preceding the Tet offen_
sive the Hanoi leaders thought that the South Vietnarnese rnasses rvere
ready to shift their alLegiance to the Cornrnunists based on the rner_
gence of such rnovernent6 as the Peoplers Salvation Movement, the
various Buddhist struggle carnpaigns, and the constant division arnong
nationalist parties, They also thought that the South Vietnarnese dis_
liked the Arnericans and were so unhappy with the war that they would.
ri.se up and overthrow the adrninistration of President Nguyen-Van_
Thieu.

Secondly, they thought the South Vietnarnese regirne had
grown so weak Iollowing the down_{all of Ngo Dinh Diern that its ar-
rned forces had ceased to be efficient,both in the defensive and the o{_
fensive. In the third place, they also must have reckoned, that follow-
ing Viet Cong successes in 1956-67, the Cornmunists realLy stood a
chance of bringing an all-out offensive campaign to a successful con_
clusion - especially since they had the benefits of strategic op-
'rtwo
portunities and one tactical advantagetr,
The first strategic opportunity was the U.S. presiden_
tial election late in 1958. Candidates such as Richard M. Nixon and
Robert Kennedy were criticizing President Lyndon B. Johnsonts Viet-
narn policy and adding more oil to the antiwar fire in the U, S. The
Hanoi leaders also rnust have thought that if the general attacks were
to prove successful, the internal difficultie s encountered by the out-
going adrninistration would rnake it irnpossible for Johnson to send
reinforcernents to South Vietnarn and reduce it to seeking negotiations
on conditions favorable to the Comrnunists.
The second strategic opportunity was the rnounting anti_
U. S.feeling around the world which could be traced to its participa-
tion in the Vietnarn war. Again, in Hanoits view, a series of big vic-
tories would result in the crystallization of such current of public
opinion, dernanding an end to the protracted Vietnarn crisis, that
Washington would find it irnpossible to resist.

In addition since both sides had proclairned a stand down
in war activities, there wa6 a signi{icant tactical advantage to be
gained frorn the surprise attacks to be rnounted during the holiday
aea60n.

The Comrnunist High Cornrnand, of course, was fully

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