Page 43 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968

Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh talked about the possibilities of
peace negotiations with the U.S. . Trinhrs rnove possibly intended to
rnislead Washington on what the Hanoi leadership really had in rnind.
A f ew days later Ho Chi Minh , over Radio Hanoi,read
a four-line poern wishing the Vietnarnese nation success in the corning
Year of the Monkey, Students of Vietnarnese history now agree that
this poern contained Hanoirs order for the unprecedented offensive of
1967, Here follows the text o{ the poern with a rough translation :
niv hdn hj.r .trl xuan qua,
tr6n tin vui khd ;"./a;;.
Blc thi dua danh

Toin thlng !t ,rd t. ! "

It This Springtirne certainly will be rnore joyous than all
such previous seasons,
rr For news of victories will corne frorn all part6 of the
country,
rr North and South (our people and our soldiers)will corn-
pete in the anti-Arnerican struggle,
rr Forward we go,
And total victory will be our s rr .

On the surface no one would suspect the real intent of the
rnessage - an order for battle, This order was thought by rnost people
to be sirnply a call for rnore sacrjJices in preparation for great victo-
ries in the distant future. In reality the Viet Cong leadership used the
poern as the basis for a study docurnent detailing what the troops were
expected to do when the TCK-TKN Plan was to be irnplernented,

Even though Giaprs blueprint had not been rnade public
in any way, interrogations of prisoners of war, political returnees and-
others, prior to and following the Tet attacks, revealed an idea of
what it was. With its code narne consisting of two parts rrTCKrr and
rrTKNrr, it was possibly conceived to include two phases : that of gene-
ral offensive and that of general uprisings.

The TCK-TKN provided for simultaneous attacks against
key targets throughout South Vietnarn which would then be followed by
political agitation conducive to an overthrow of the present adrninis-
tration and the formation of a new governrnent. The plan also provided
for an alternative in the event of a failure in the first phase. In that