Page 47 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968

sought in rnid-1967,to give the NLF a new irnage ailowing it to publish
,
a new political prograrn, This was decided to enlarge the political
base o{ the NLF organization but the rnove did not fool rnarry people.

NAPDF, along with the. Winter_Spring Carnpaign, was
given rnuch publicity by the Cornrnunist propaganda rnedia in an effort
to attract the support of the intellectuals in the cities and give the
cornrnunist rnovelyler rn honorable appearance in the event of the for-
rnati.on of a coalitior jovernrnent, In the capital city ol Saigon,NAPDF
did not have the tirne to do anything. It was later learned that its Cen_
tral Executive Cornrnittee included such figures as Attorney Trinh
Dinh Thao (chairrnan), Mr. Larn Van Tet, and Venerable Thich Don.
Hau of the Buddhist struggle rnovernent in Hue. In the forrner irnperial
capital the local NAPDF organization was tnore successfdl. It was
presented to the public and had enough tirne to be at the origin oi quite
a few di sturbance s.
The TCK- TKN plan was such a detailed plan that it also
provided for the spreading of a rurnors. According to one such rurnor,
NLF troops would only attack South vietnarnese installations and units
and would leave the Arnericans alone in keeping with the terrns of a
secret agreernent between the Viet Cong and the U. S. In reality V, C.
troops tried their best to avoid attacking u.s. instarlation6. That fact,
following the pre-Tet rulnors and developrnents, created sorne uneasi_
ness in U.S. - South vietnarnese relations,

,4. few rnonths belore Tet, at about the sarne tirne Nguyen
Duy Trinh disclosed North VietnariTas ready for negotiating a,rr-"rra
to the c onflj.ct, sorne NLF representative6 reported.ly arrived in Sai_
gon to contact the U.S. Ernbassy. One of the Viet Cong ernissaries,
it was widely believed then, was captured by police, In the ensuing
days,Police Director General Nguyen Ngoc Loan reportedly sub_
rnitted his resignation in protest of U.S. interference in internal
South Vietnarnese ajfairs. The rurnor went that the Council of Minis_
ters refused to consider Loanrs request and asked hirn to stay on.
According to the.sarne rurnor, South Vietnarnese inflexi.
bility toward the Viet Cong was instrurnental in Washington's secret
acquiescence to allow C ornrnunist troops to pass and attack GVN in_
stallations. By the sarne reasoning, such a direct confrontation be_
tweenthe fighting brothers would give the Arnericans the golden oppor-
tunity.of assessing the capabilities of the Viet Cong vis_a_vis theii
South Vietnarnese allies 60 that a really practical ipproach couLd. be

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