Page 50 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968

C ornrnunist High C ornrnand also planned a political assault against
the cities. The political assault was carried out by a substantial nurn-
ber o{ troops and agents in populated areas, especially in the poor
sections of the cities. The Cornrnunist carnpaign was planned with the
participation of political agents whose role was to incite the popula-
tion to revolt and dernand the forrnation of a new adrninistr ation '
Hanoi had infiltrated some 300 intellectuals of all profes-
sions and fanned thern out to various regions of South Vietnarn in prep-
aration for the Winter-Spring Carnpaign. Their purpose was one of
creating a political and cultut'al front for the reginentation of the
rrlasses following an expected rout of the south vietnarnese arrned force6.
The Cornrnunist High C ornrnand ordered a total of 97 bat-
talions on the rnove for the general offensive. Although these units
boasted local narnes, they included a great rnany North Vietnarnese
who had only arrived South a couple of rnonths before. Most inJiltrators
were teenagers. Sorne of thern were children who were barely 15 years
of age.
Why the Hanoi regirne dispatched these children to cer-
tain death rernains a rnatter of pure speculation. Morally the decision
was crirninal. Militarily the decision was also a bad one si'nce the se
inexperienced cornbatants, fighting in very unfarniliar terrain, could
not be expected to achieve a gteat deal. This was one of the reasons
why the Cornmunists failed to achieve anything of lasting consequence
in thelr Tet offensive,
The above observations, however, shouldnot obscure
the fact that the Cornrnunits were able to keep their TCK-TKN Plan
c ornpletely secret until the tirne of irnplerne ntation They also were
'
quite successful in coordinating their attacks according to a master
plan which was initially intended f or implernentation on Tet eve.

Strategically and tactically the insurgents relied on two
key principles of Cornrnunist military dogrna. They sought rnaxirnurn
surprise by rnoving thelr troops as speedily as Possible frorn bases
to target areas. As the rnornent arrived for launching the offensivg
they also sought to confuse Allied cornrnanders by pretending to rnount
attacks at places other than already chosen targets' Khe Sanh and
sorrre border outposts were such secondary targets' Hanoi rnilitary
leaders were really directing Lheir rnain efforts at Saigon and other
big c itie s.

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