Page 46 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968

c onfident that itrs plan would be successful but it also took comfort in
two possible developrnents in the event the rnaster plan of Vo Nguyen
Giap failed, Giap reportedly thought that the insurgent rnovernent waa
firrnly entrenched in the jungle and countryside of South Vietnarn' He
thought that, even if the offensive against the cities should turn into a
debacle, its strength would rernain unchanged.

Giap also reckoned that the offensive carnpaign would
perforce result in rnany casualties on the attackers but this would not
be too serious since North Vietnarnrs soutce of rnanpower would re-
rnain intact in spite of the pounding of its territory frorn the air. In
Giaprs calculation the ability of Hanoi to replace casualties was about
three tirne6 greater than Saigonrs, that of North Vietnarn plus one half
of South Vietnarn.

With the TCK-TKN Plan,C ornrnuni st comrnanders hoped
to derive rnaxirnurn advantage frorn the lirnited nurnber of cornbatants
they could field. They hoped to take sorne of the key rnilitary installa-
tions and,with the help of popular uprisings,to take over the adrninis-
tration of the land, They also thought that in the face of such a comPlete-
ly novel situation the Arnericans would be reduced to throwing in the
towel as they would find thernselves in the irnpossible situation of
using airpower against such populated areas as Saigon with ite

3,000,000 pe ople .
Moreover they must have reckoned th?t with the
ernergence of a new rrg overnrnentrr, all undefeated Arrny of the Republic
of Vietnarn (ARVN) units would have to surrender. In the case of hard-
core GVN, they would reduce thern one by one rnilitarily or would
proselyte thern with the help of rnilitary dependents and Cornrnunist
syrnpathizer s.
The Cornrnunist High Cornmand deployed rnany of their
best political cadres in their attacks against the cities and townships
with the hope of fostering several disturbances leading to the forrna-
tion of a new adrnini str ation. They especially launched a new lnove-
rnent called the National Alliance of Peace and Dernocratic Forces
(NAPDF) which purportedly was a {ront grouping all political partieE
and factions in South Vi"etnarn.

The new front was nothing but another organization cre-
ated and directed by Hanoi pretty rnuch the sarne way the National Lib-
eration Front (NLF)was launched sorne years before. Conscious of the
fact that the NLF was too closely identified with it, the Hanoi regirne

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