Page 440 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968
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regarded as of prirne irnportance  both strategically  and tactically by
       the Cornrnunists  because it is adjacent to North Vietnarn whose front-
       line is in the South, The Tri  Thien area, furtherrnore, serves as
       supply channel frorn the North to the South. Consequently,  to the Com-
       rnunists, the city of Hue is just as vital  as Saigon frorn both rnilitary
       and political points of view.
                         At the sarne tirne as their rnilitary  areas in the III
       Corps were reorganized, the Cornrnunists  also revarnped their Tri
       Thien Zone into four areas, each forming a battlefront  in the same
       way as the sub-zones in the III Corps. The Tri-Thien-Hue  zone had
       forrned until then two distinct fronts,  one ca1led B5 front running
       frorn Highway 9 to the North, and one cal1ed 87 frorn Highway  9
       toward Hue,
                         As Hue had been the hotbed of several anti-governrnent
       rnovernents, and a comrnunist victory there would entail significant
       developments, the enerny decided to forrn two other fronts,  one run-
       ningfrornThuaThientoHueandtheotherfrornsouthofThuaThien
       and Phu Loc to the Hai Van Pass.
                         The {our fronts were established  by May, 1967 with
       special assignrnents to a total of 50 Cornrnunist battalions,  under
       cornbined cornrnands in preparation for the general offensive. Terri-

       torial  cornponents  of the four areas were as follows  :
                         -  Area I      Gio Linh, Carn Lo, North Hung Hoa, Hy Lap.
                         -  Area II     TrLeu Phong, Hai Lang, Quang  Ha city.
                         -  Area III    Huong Thuy, Phu Vang, l{uong Tra,  Quang
                                        Dien, Phong Dien (Hue area).
                         -  Area IV     Phu Loc (South of Hue vicinity of Hai Van
                                        Pass).
                         This shows that any reforrn, territorial  or otherwise,
       rnade by the Cornrnunists  irnplies serious planning for action, and
       that their general offensive of 1968 had been prepared  since rnid-1957
       with Saigon and Hue as the tv/o rnain targets'

                         During the 25 days o{ fighting in Hue they were able to
       set up a revolutionary adrninistration  with the so-called  Alliance of
       Dernocratic  and Peaceful Forces. The Cornrnunists considered  this
       as a rnajor political victory that could serve as a pattern for future at-
       tacks against the cities.  Although the battle o{ Hue was characterized
       by a relatively strong, combined US - Vietnarnese force which included
       the US lst Marine Division, lst Airborne Division, and the RVN Ist


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