Page 441 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968

Infantry Division, The Cornrnunist6 were able to control the city {or
26 days. Was this the result of their rnilitary territorial reorganiza_
tion, which enabled the enerny to attack with equal strength on all
fronts, and to launch a direct assault against Hue while retaining the
US Marine s at Khe Sanh ?

The sarne pattern was seen in the Saigon area, although
here the enerny failed in his atternpt to fornent a popular uprising,
their five attacking forces corning frorn the five zones around Saigon
were nonetheless able to penetrate the capital city before the offensive
was repelled.

That they could reach the cityrs suburbs without
encountering any resistance was due to the {act that our villages
around the capital had not been well defended, and the cause of this
defective defense systern carne frorn the territorial organization
itself :

In 1956 the Sai.gon rnilitary district included four sectors;
Tay Ninh, Cholon, Gia Dinh and the capiral city, By the end of 1956,
the reorganized capital rnilitary district cornprised Saigon, Cholon and
the provinces of Gia Dlnh and Long An.
trarly in 1961, when the country was divided into four
corps Areas, the capital rnilitary district was transforrned into the
Capital Special Zone and reduced to Saigon and Cia Dinh province only.
By the end of 1965 the Capital Special Zone was renarned
again to the capitar Military district with the sarne territories prus the
Con Son special zone.
Since July 18, 1966, with the sarne territories, it was
changed to the Special Zone and placed under the direct cornrnand of
the III Corps with the responsib lities and prerogatives of a tactical
zone and no longer under direct cornrnand of the General Staff as
before. This organization still prevailed at the tirne of the l96g Corn_
rnunist general offen sive.

The RVN and Cornrnunist rnilitary territori.al organiza_
tions thus can be described as entirely different frorn each other. It
was not known whether our rnilitary auth rities at the tirne, when
defining our various rnilitary areas, had taken into account the enemy
situation, since the villages around the capital as well as a qurnber
of towns acros$ the city happened to be heavily infiltrated by the
Cornrnunists, No counterrneasures had been taken on our part.

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