Page 445 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968

Optirnistic observers rnaintained that the battle of
Con Tien lasted nearly 3 rnonthe because the enernyrs rear consisted
of a border sanctuary frorn where they could launch infantry or
artillery attacks against allied positions at Con Tien, onLy 12 kilo-
rneters frorn the Laotian border and 8 kilorneters frorn the Ben Hai
River.

Sirnilar conditions prevailed at Loc Ninh, only 14
kilorneters frorn the C arnbodian border. The enerny attack against Loc
Ninh was rnainly airned at creating a psychological irnpact on world
public opinion while the attacking forces could withdraw into safety
across the border.

The Dak To front also was aeen as having the sarne
characteristics as it wa6 on the Vietnarn- Lao s -C arnbodia border
area.
The sarne observers would conclude that all the enerny
attacks were desperate rnilitary atternpts airned only at influencing
world opinion, without significant succes6 however.
To be rnore objective, we should take into consideration
the facr that, starting frorn June 1967, the C ornrnunists worked hard
on the revarnping and redeployrnent of their forces in preparatlon for
their 1968 general offensive. The enerny attack6 in late 1962 therefore
could be described as battle ground testing actions with different
tactical characteristics. At Con Tien, for exarnple, the enerny ins-
talled their artillery units in artificial caves dug in rnountain slopes.
They would pull thern out for sudden barrages against allied posi.tions
and push thern back into the caves a6 soon aa the barrages ended to
avoid allied counter fire and air strj.kes. In the rneantirne, their
infantry troops would advance into Con Tien through converging
trenches. They kept fighting while diggingand seldorn ernerged above
the ground level. The attack was sirnilar to Dien Bien Phu which they
wanted to repeat with the attacking troops advancing through rnultiple
trenches, But in the face of an allied airforce twenty tirnes rnore
powerful than the French airforce in 1954 and a counterattack frorn
outside the base by our infantry elernents in Septernber 7967, the
C ornrnuni st 3248 Diwision finally had to withdraw frorn Con Tien.
At Loc Ninh and later on at Phuoc Qua, the Reds
launched their attacks with the hope of luring our troops into a selected
battle ground near the border whi.ch could only be advantageous to
thern. They were using a new tacti.c which they called trthree attack6,

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