Page 448 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968
P. 448

quently reduced frorn 70, 000 regular rnen to 35, 000 or 36,000. Hanoi
      had to rnaintain a high infiltration rate to replenish  the Cornrnunist
      forces in the South,

                         In 1967, an average of 7, 000 rnen infiltrated frorn North
       Vietnarn into the South each rnonth, The figure for January  1958 only
       rose to 22,000 rnen. It went down to 15,000 rnen in February 1968 and
       rose again during the following rnonths.
                         By the end of. 1967, there were 95,000 North Vietnarnese
      troops in the South.

                         The Viet Cong, who had had recruiting problerns  since
       early 1967, were able to recruit cnly 3,500 rnen each rnonth during
      1967 as cornpared with 7,500 rnen each rnonth in 1966.

                         Before the general offensive of Tet Mau Than, the
      enerny strength was estirnated  at 325,000 men including 147,200
      belonging to cornbat and guerilla units. There were at least 79, 000
      North Vietnarnese  soldiers belonging to purely North Yietnarnese
      units, and 16,000 North Vietnarnese in the so-called Viet Cong ranks,
      In reality,  75/a of the enerny cornbat regirnents were North Vietnarnese.
      This figure could even be higher.

                        In the rneantirne,  enerny efforts were being rnade
      toward the forrnation of a nurnber of regi.onal  units,

                         The enerny L'adlZ9,200 cornbat and guerilla soldiers
      before the general offensive andI47,000 when the offensive started.
      These belonged  to I0 divisions (instead of 9 before the offensive), 52
      regirnents (instead  of 45 before the offensive)  and 274 battalions
      (instead of 230 before the offensive),
                         Thus, the entire rnilitary  stxength of North Vietnarn
      was deployed into the South through in-filtration in the course of 1967,
      C ornrnunist returnees frorn the VC 308th and 32Oth Divisions at Carn
      Lo (Quang Tri)  on January 26, 1968 revealed that only 3 or 4 divisions
      stayed behind in North Vietnarn  and these were corrlposed  of youths
      in rnilitary  service. Docurnents  published in Hanoi showed that by
      the end oL 1967, North Vietnarnrs  potential rnilitary manpower was
      3, 200, 000 including all rnale citizens frorn 18 to 45 years old, HalJ
      of this  nurnber  was used in rnilitary,  para-rnilitary and civilian
      activities  as follows | 425,000 rnen in the regular forces (including
      those on duty in the South) ; 230,000 rnen in the security force;
      160, 000 dead;  1, 000, 000 in the po^:ular and public service force,

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