Page 449 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968
P. 449

making a total of 1, 815, 000 rnen. The rernaining  t,400, 000 rnen
       were serving in other branches  of activity.
                         This rneans that if North Vietnarn  elected to send South
       a1t young n-ren frorn 18 to 25, the in-filtration figrrre could reach
       350,000.
                                          7 year groups l8-25
                         (1,400, 000 x.                             :  350,000  )
                                          ZSyear groups I8-45
       Such a rnilitary buildup in the South, however,  would jeopardize the
       econorny in the North and would create huge logistical problerns'  It
       would also cause resentrnent  arnong  C ornrnuni st South Vietnarnese
       cadres because  of its being entirely North Vietnamese.

                         As a rnatter of fact,  eneny units involved in the Tet
       offensive already were composed rnostly of North Vietnarnese  soldiers.
       They were all young lnen, lr-rany sti11 under 14 or l'5' They had been
       infiltrated into the South for  a few rnonths and had never participated

       in any battle befor e.
                         While increasing their infiltration of rnen into the South,
       the North Vietnarrre se also sorrght to rnodernize  the weaPonry  of the
       Cornmunist  forces in the South, beginning late in 1967. Arrns and
       arr-rr-nunit  on were continuously sent Soutli through the Ho Chi Minh
                 j.
      trail  and by sea.
                         During the Iast ;hree rnonths of 1967  the Comrrrunists
                                                                     '
       infiltrated into South Vietnarn frorrr 107 to 320 tons of rnilitary equip-
       r-nent per day. By neid-1967,  North Vietnarnese trucks were seen at
       the three-border area, while at sea the enerny used 100-ton boats
       or rrotored boats disguised as foreign fishing vessels to transport
       their arrrs,  These boats would navigate  in international  waters  and
       reach  secret poits on the South Vietnarnese coast at night' Their
       trarrsportation systern  was faultless thanks to a  wc.Ll organized
       liaison and inf orrnation network that had been set up throughout the
       nititary  areas. The systelr.r consists of liaison stations installed
       along the irifiltration routes, at intervals of 4 to 8 hours walk depend-
       ing on the length of each route segrrlent and its dangers' Several
       starioirs on the same route are ca,l1ed a liaison 1ine. Connected lines
       fornr the enerrryts liaisor'l network across South Vietnarn. Personnel
       at each station consists of two to four agents depending on its irn-
       portance and headed by a chief of station- The stations and their
       transportation. of alrns and equiprnent were seldorn discovered' It
       has to be notecl that t1-re enerr-ryrs I'iai":on and inforrrration  systern  was
       tho:ouqi'Iy reorgar,ized in the course of 1967 probably as            Part  of the
       !'eieral   offei,sive  pIarr.

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