Page 337 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968
P. 337

Tet offensive as he did in the case of several other towns and cities.
       He had to fight all the way frorn his bases which were far frorn the
       c ity.


                         B.  DEVELOPMENT  OF THE BATTLES

                        The enerny launched his offensive on Quang Ngai city on
       the rnorning of the Second Day o{ Tet, Jan 3I,  or rrore than 24 hours
       later than his offensives against  rnost other I and II Corps cities.  The
       attack did not start until 0400 hours which was only Z IfZ  howr s
       before daybreak.  This tirne had norrnally been the tirne for withdrawal
       for rnost guerrilla assault forces in the Vietnarn  War.
                        There never was any solid evidence  for the reasons
       behind this delayed action. One educated guess was that the enerny had
       apparently underestirnated  the ability of the city defenders to with-
       stand his rnassive assauJt.The enerny thought that the city rnight be
       taken in a rnatter of hours. Why did he wait so Iong to unleash the
       offensive and thuB fight in the daltirne, a tirne which norrnally favored
       the Vietnarnese forces with their artillery  and airstrikes  ? Or had
       there been challenging  logistical problerns  to solve before he could
       begin his attack ? No enerny docurnents  captured later gave any clue
       to a firrn and clear answer nor did any staternents by enerny soldiers
        captured in action.

                        The enerny opened a tenrtrinute rnortar barrage around
        0400 hours on several sensitiwe areas in town including the Znd Infan-

       try  Diwision Cornrnand  he adquarte r s    ,the RF and PF Training  Center
        on the other side o{ the Tra  Khuc River and  other intown rnilitary
        installations  such as the airfield and the provincial  adrninistration
       headquarters. The shelling which lacked accuracy and ferocity, cau-
        sed no casualties and very tight darnage in the areas o{ irnpact, Whatrs
        more it woke up and prepared the de{enders for attacks  which soon
        fo1lowed.
                        The enerny lauirched. his planned ground assaults as soon
        as his last round of rnortar fire  landed in town. Assaults were planned
        on at least ten rnili.tary and adrninstrative  objectives  to include  the
        Mount Ong and Mount But bases, the 4th Regirnent Cornrnand  headquar-
       ters,  the airfield,  the city jai1, the city police station, the Rural
        De veloprnent Servic e, the Provincial  Adrnini strative  Headquarters,
        the Znd Divlsion  Cornrnand  and the RF and PF training center.





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