Page 61 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968
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thousands of l22rnrn rockets and 8Zrnrn rnortar round.s, sowing death
and terror arnong the population-
In surnrnary, the Ccrnrnunist High Cornrnand had changed
its strategy in a rnost unrnistakable rylanner. During the Tet offensive
enerny troops attacked governrnent and rnili.tary installations in an
effort to create propitious conditions {or the dispatch of political cadres
to the cities where they could incite the people to overthrow the legal
adrnini st ratio n. In both Cornrnunist pushes in May, the tactics ernployed
airned at a protracted occupation of territory while reducing casualties
on the basis of lessons learned {rorn past offensives. The enerny did not
rnortar population centers indi sc r irninately during Tet while in May
tension was kept high with constant bornbardrnents of the cities.
Should one compare these two carnpaigns one would corne
to the conclusion that the Tet offensive was launched with the intention
of achieving a quick victory. After the Tet failure the second offensive
vtas started with a cornbination of ground assaulta and air attacks which
had littie chance of leading to a rnilitary victory of any proportion.
lvhat the enerny rea1ly sought in this second atternpt was to subvert the
South Vietnarnese adrninistration politically and econornically and to
give the cornrnon people the feeling that all was lost and that anything
would be better than their present predicarnent.
These atternpts, however, failed to produce anything of
Iasting consequence. In the face of strong allied reactions rnost V. C,
soldiers lost courage. With morale problerns increasing tenfold along
with the nurnber of dead arnong their ranks, rnany Cornrnunist troops
sought to put an end to their personal dilernrnas. euite a few surren-
dered en rnasse just in the hope of being allowed to live.
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