Page 60 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968

seemed to have reli.ed rnilitarily on guerrilla warfare tactics, arnended
to sorne extent to fit the conditions of city fighting.

One week after the May offensive was started Cornrnunist
intruders were swept out of Saigon. On 25 May they were back. They
infiltrated frorn the Northern outskirts of Gia Dinh and the Southern
outskirts near the rrY bri.dge. They again applied the tactics of
hugging populated areas and frorn these to strike at sweeping goverrr-
rne nt troops.
In this second atternpt enemy units fully exploited the
shortcornings of friendly security be1ts. Enerny presence was only
discovered after they had penetrated the cityrs outlying areas. North
Yietnarnese troops took the trouble of occupying such key points as big
buildings, {actories, churches and ternples before going on the attack in
ar-y area. They also used such open areas as parks and cerneteries
where they speedily dug trenches and other defensive installations .
AIter securing the occupation of a target area the intru-
ders would irnrnediately agk for reinforcernents. The new troops would
take advantage of darltness to rnove in by srnall groups, These troops,
however, were extrernely well-equipped and their firepower was
cornparable to that of any such forrnation in the world.
The cornposition of these groups were rnostly troops that
had had sorne rest after a previous atternpt against the big city. In
principle they were to take turns in attacking Saigon" so that the V. C.
rnilitary pressure rnight be constantly rnaintained against this political
center. A1go, in their e{fort to bring guerrilla warfare to the cities,
Viet Cong troops unable to resist {riendly pressure in one area would
rnove to another and start the whole process all over again.

In adopting such a strategy the Cornrnunist High Cornrnand
was willing to accept sorne casualties in exchange Ior the understanda-
bly heavy logses friendly troops would su{fer in attacking the buildings
Cornrnunist troops had turned into strongholds. On the whole the enerny
did not concentrate his troops but divided thern into rnany squad-size
groups with the instruction to fight until the end.

Against this background one understands why the advanging
friendly troops rnet with so rnany dif{iculties and in sorne cases had
to call in air power and artillery. They were not the only ones to resort
to artillery and bornbs against populated areas. The Viet Cong, while
continuing the second wave of attacks, pounded residential areas with

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