Page 59 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968

New V.C. Strategy

In their first atternpt at rnounting a general offensive the
Cornrnunist High Cornrnand deployed assault troops everywhere but
they soon recognized that this rnove was a grave rnistake. Attacks can
only be rnounted when the assaulting troops are rnore nulnerous than
the defenders. Should the contrary be true,failure would be rnore apt
to result. N{oreover, without air support, the Cornrnunists could only
hope for victory if they outnurnbered friendly troops in target areas.
The only way to achieve this was to.assault thern repeatedly.
Recognition of this truth shook Cornrnunist corrrrnanders
out of their drearns for a speedy victory and they selected the cities -
especially Saigon - as the targets of the new offensive carnpaign. In
their reckoning nothing would be rnore effective than keeping strong
rnilitary pressure on Saigon for such a strategy would perforce result
i.n an atrnosphere of growing confusion in the political nerve-center
o{ South Vietnarn and be a propaganda victory of sorts abroad.
In their May offensive the Viet Cong strategy was reduced
to the following five points : (a) to avoid {rontal attacks on {riendly
installations; (O) to intiltrate populous areas, especially during the
hours of darkness and wherever friendly troops \Mere thinly deployed;
(c) to stay in an occupied area and fight until the end regardless o{
darnages; (d) in the absence of friendly reaction to spread to neigh-
boring areas and request reinforcernents; and (5) to rely on sapper
troops as rnuch as possible so that V,C. rnilitary pressure should be
felt by the frlendly troops both frorn within and without.
In the troubled days of May nurnerous enerny troops
penetrated such areas as Thi Nghe, Bay Hien, Minh Phung, Binh Thoi,
Binh Tien and Pharn The Hien. Although governrnent units were
successful in preventing the Cornrnunists frorn spreading to other
areas, they had to call in air and artillery support to elirninate the
intruders and get the situation under control.
The intention of the enerny High Cornrnand, of course,
was not to achieve big rnilitary victories but to create a state of
con{usion that could lead to irnrnense political and econornic difficulties
and bring about opportunities for overthrowing the elected governrnent
of South Vietnarn. In this undertaking the Cornrnunist High Cornrnand

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