Page 140 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968
P. 140

At 0215 hours, the insurgents  resortedto anintense  rnor-
        tar barrage to give additional punch to their frontal thrust,  Mortar
        rounds and 8.40 rockets continuously  pounded the cornrnand post of the
        governrnent battalion but due to the positions fortifications, no casual-
        ties were recorded.  Ten rninutes later their ground troops began the
        real attack.
                        They did not reckon with the presence  o{ a reconnaissance
        squad lying out of carnp ready to       rrwelcornert   thern. As soon as the
        enerny showed therns elve s ,they were cut down. The  whole nttacking
        force was rnowed down by rnachinegun  fire,Following  this a total of 40
        dead VC bodies were  c ount ed,including  that of a rnan narned. Muoi,the
        Deputy Cornrnanding Officer of the First  Battalion. Governrnent  sol-
        diers also took six B,40 rocket launchers, two rnachi.neguns, two rno r-
        tar tubes, 36 AK,47 autornatic  rifles,  Z0 pounds of TNT, and about a
        ton of arnrnunition.

                        This vlctory was credited to the reconnaissance squad
        whi.ch initially  had the sirnple task of alerting the rnain body of troops
        of the Viet Cong attack. These reconnaissance troopers  struck  the
        enerny a deadly blow at the initial  rninute  of the encounter.  The insur-
        gents never had the chance of doing anything before they were decirna-
        ted. The extent of their {ailure can be rneasured by their inability  to
        even take away the bodies of their dead, that o{ their Deputy Cornrnan-
        der inc luded.
                        Another truisrn also has begun to slowly ernerge  frorn
       this battle, The Viet Crng battalionrs inability to even approach  the
        cornrnand post o{ the Ranger unit can be traced to their very poor no-
        raLe, Indeed, following  the incredibly  high losses recorded by  this
       unit in the first  wave of attacks,    j.t  had to fill  up its depleted ranks with
       youths forcefully drafted. These constituted  the rnajority. According
       to a prisoner of war he had only two weeks of training before  being
        assi-gned to his unit and sent to war.

                        A litt1e paat noon on Z February a rnechanized  in{antry
        elernent of the U. S. Arrny clashed with the Viet Cong just  over  one
        rnile out of Hoc Mon and about ten rnlles northwest of Saigon. The en-
        counter lasted until early evening. At about the sarne tirne, gove rnrnent
       rnarines sweeping through the Binh Hoa intersection  atea  and  the
        Hang Xanh section also inflicted         gorne   losses on the enerny.

                        During the night fighting again flared up in the Tan  Son
       Nhut area. The enerny apparently had received sorrre rein{orcernents
       and intensified his pressure just north of the Quang Trung  Training


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