Page 165 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968
P. 165

These units were rnore successful si.nce they succeeded
       in penetrating  sorrre of the populoua  areas and were able to  6tay
       there,  The reason for their relative 6uccess is attributed to the weak
       defense line rnaintained  in this part of the rnetropolis.

                        Prior  to the May offensive defense around Saigon ir:Iuded
       only ten battalions  deployed as follows : the first  Airborne Task Force
       in Go Vap and An Nhon, the Fifth Ranger Group in Phu Tho Hoa,
       Marine Task Force        rrArr  in the area of Binh Loi and highways bridges.
       Within Saigon there was only the Riot Police.

                       Considering the few units the Jefense of Saigonrs
       southern  section was rather weak. The southern approach  was given
       1itt1e attention  by the allied high cornrnand. Further to the South there
       were sorne deployed US infantry battalions  of the Ninth and 25 lnfantry
       Divi s ion s.

                        The Arnerican battalions,  rnoreover, were strong forces
       that were only efficient  against big enemy units. Against the many
       srna1l groups of cornrnunist  infiltrators  the Arnericans  could not do
       rnuch, Cnce the Cornrnunists had entered the city,  they tried their
       best to keep to populated areas to prevent strong allied reaction. The
       first  infiltrators  were to establish  sorne kind of bridgehead for later
       reinforcernent  which together  were to rnake a thrust against the center
       of the c ity.

                        With this tactic enerny troops did all they could to occupy
       a large area west and south of Saigon. To cope with the rnounting
       danger, the allies had to call in airpower and the intervention of US
       ground troops. These, however, resulted in over 8,000 houses
       destroyed in the Pharn The Hien area alone.

                        North of Saigon the enerny failed prior to entering the
       outlying areas. The 101st Viet Cong Regirnent, reputedly one of the
       best for  street-fightingr was destroyed  by governrnent airborne
       forces-
                        In surnrnaryr the second Viet Cong offensive resulted
       in a collapse of the rnorale of Viet Cong troops. It was also the first
       tirne cornrnunist soldiers  surrendered en rrlasse rnore than once.
       Such famed units as the Dong Nai and Quyet Tien Regirnents  were
       completely  destroyed  during this phase of the attack, The battle
       resulted  in the death of sorne 3, 500 corrrrrunist soldiers out of a total
       deployrnent of sorne 7,000. Cver 55% of the initial Viet Cong force


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