Page 164 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968
P. 164

frorn the border area of Long An and Hau Nghia provinces.

                        The intruders were stopped  the day following their
        arrival  in this area. They di.d not dare enter the city during the day
        tirne for fear of being decirnated by airstrikes.  Instead they penetrated
        the sprawling rnetropolis in srnall groups trying to avoid allied troops,
        thus never rnassing  enough strength for  a coordinated  attack. Likewise
        their fi-fth colurnn  sapper units were cripled during the first  day thus
        rnaking their  outside probe ineffective.

                        The Viet Cong tactlcs had been one to attack the city both
       frorn within with sappers and frorn without with regular troops. The
       attack frorn within was to include rnany arrned fernale propaganda
       tearns. But this tactic never had a chance  of rnaterializing since all
       propaganda  groups worked in cornplete isolation without the support  of
       the pe ople,
                        Since Saigon is  such a large and sprawling city  the few
       propaganda  tearns that the Viet Cong could rnuster had no irnpact.  Thus'
        their propaganda  battle was ineffective. Riot police speedily  annihilated
        those few srnal1 tearns that did exist.

                        Cn the second day the enerny continued  his in-filtration
        er{orts in Saigonrs weatern section' since interdiction artillery  and
       flares possibly had prevented        Potential   intruders frorn entering the
        city during dark, Although the enerny was unable to reinforce wi'th
        rnore troops the front of Binh Thoi  and Cholon expanded  to a srnall
        degree, because of the situation in the build-up area.

                        A new battle line was visible on the second day at the
        intersection  of Bay Hien, Here the elernents of the ZTZnd Regirnent'
        a cornponent  of the CT. 9 Division,  had the task of attacking  the Tan
        Son Nhut Airbase and penetrating neighboring areas.  The intruders
        had counted on the elernent of surprise that did not exist. They had
        atternpted to corne into town in srnall groups but had failed to set up
        liaison arnong thernselves.  Thus without         Proper   liaison they were
        unable to rnount a coordinated  attack. It was the end of the Bay Hien
        front.
                        On the f ollowing days the enerny High Comrnand continued
        to  deploy rnore troops in this area especially  those that took part in
        the  rtTetrr  offensive, for exarnple the Phu Loi Battalion, Battalion  808'
        Battalion  Nha Be Five,  and Battalion 265. All these units came
        towards Saigon frorn the south'





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