Page 299 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968

As far as the enerny offensive was concerned the enerny
failed in his two rnajor objectives : occupying the city and paralyzing
the se two airfie ld s.
The other rnajor factors behind the enerny defeats were
that:

- Battalions Z/L and,3/7were conducting a support operations for the
local rural developrnent tearns in the not distant Trieu phong and Hai
Lang areas;

- An airborne battalion had been airlifted to strengthen the cityrs
defense perirneter in the Long Hung and Hanh Hoa harnlets;

- I/I n a.iualion supported. by an ApC squadron, was being stationed
on the western side of the city; and
- The peoplers passive defense prograrn was carried out with preci._
sion and effec tivene s s.
Were it not for these preparations euang ?ri as a
frontline city, rnight not have been able to defend itself durin! this
general offensive. The local governrnentrs and peoplers rnoral and
physical preparedness and ability largely contributed to the enerny
defeat, Assaulting Quang Tri city, the enerny had operated in an
entirely hostile area and was certainly bound to be defeated. lf this
was a strategic rnistake of the enerny, it should be a perrnanent
rerninder for the rest of the country.

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